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Abstract
We offer a new explanation for why taxes have become less progressive in many
countries in parallel with an increase in income inequality. When performance-
based compensation differentials are needed to incentivize effort, redistribution
through progressive income taxes becomes less precisely targeted. Taxation re-
duces after-tax income inequality but undermines incentive contracts, lowering
effort and raising pre-tax income differentials. Market integration can widen the
spread of project returns and make contract choices more responsive to changes
in the level of taxation, resulting in a lower optimum income tax rate even when
individuals are not inter-jurisdictionally mobile.
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1 Introduction
Starting from the 1980s, the distribution of income of many developed economies has
become progressively more unequal and more concentrated.1 And yet, tax-transfer
systems have not become more redistributive—on the contrary, in a number of coun-
tries they have actually become less so. Egger et al. (2019) have recently shown that,
since the mid-1990s, economic globalization has resulted in a higher labor tax burden
on the middle classes of OECD countries and a reduced labor tax burden for the top
one percent of earners.2
The observation of greater inequality going hand-in-hand with less redistribution
through taxation poses a puzzle, and one that is of major policy importance. Standard
theories of optimal taxation would predict an increase in tax progressivity in response
to an increase in inequality (Saez, 2001; Slemrod and Bakija, 2001). A combination of
higher levels of inequality with less progressive income taxes can only be reconciled
with those theories if the increase in inequality is accompanied by an increase in the
elasticity of the tax base. Accordingly, one prominent argument in the literature is
that the tax base has become more elastic at the upper end of the income distribu-
tion because high income earners have become more inter-jurisdictionally mobile (e.g.
Lehmann et al., 2014). But for a significant fraction of individuals at the top of the in-
come distribution, international mobility remains limited (Battisti et al., 2018; Kleven
et al., 2020).3
In this paper we advance an alternative, and complementary, explanation for the
concurrent observation of higher income inequality and lower tax progressivity. Our
argument focuses on how optimal redistributive policies are affected by the interna-
tionalization of product markets—rather than labor markets.
1In many countries this has mainly happened at the top of the income distribution (Atkinson et al.,
2011). But in some countries, like the United States, it has been shown to apply to the entire distri-
bution (Piketty et al., 2018). Detailed international evidence on the development of various measures
of income inequality are collected by the OECD (http://www.oecd.org/social/income-distribution-
database.htm) and in the World Wealth and Income Database (Facundo et al., 2017).
2According to Egger et al., (2019), this reverses the pattern from the 1980s and early 1990s, when
globalization led to increased progressivity in income taxation. Similar results have been reported by
Immervoll and Richardson (2011) in a comprehensive study of redistribution policy among OECD
countries that considers both taxes and benefits. Bargain et al. (2015) decompose the increase in U.S.
income inequality since the 1980s and find a non-negligible, positive effect of tax policy changes on
income inequality.
3One likely reason for this limited mobility is that high-earning occupations, such as the provision
of legal services, often involve jurisdiction-specific human capital investment.
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Our starting point is the observation that labor markets are fundamentally shaped
by incentive contracts. This is in line with evidence that a large share of all jobs in de-
veloped countries involve some element of performance pay (Lemieux et al., 2009).4
With incentive contracts, income inequality stems from two different sources: differ-
ences in individual abilities and outcome-dependent wage differentials for individu-
als of identical abilities. Redistributive taxation can address the first source of wage
inequality but not the second, as the latter arises as a second-best market solution to
a moral hazard problem. Performance pay thus limits the redistributive role of tax
policy for any empirically observed earnings distribution.
The second building block in our argument is the observation that product mar-
ket integration is associated with higher individual income risk (Rodrik, 1997, 1998)
and steeper pay incentives (Cun˜at and Guadalupe, 2009). Globalization makes prod-
uct markets potentially more profitable, but also more competitive.5 The stronger
competition raises income risks for firms and their workers, which translates into
sharper (higher-powered) incentives in performance-based contracts. These sharper
incentives, in turn, reduce the effectiveness of income taxation as a redistributive tool,
resulting in lower optimal rates of taxation.
To develop our arguments, we describe a model of second-best contracting where
incomplete insurance is required to elicit effort in the presence of moral hazard. Risk-
averse workers with heterogeneous abilities choose between an incentive contract and
a less efficient fixed-wage contract that does not induce effort. In equilibrium, higher
productivity workers select into performance-based contracts, whereas less produc-
tive workers choose fixed-wage contracts. Economic globalization increases the vari-
ance of returns within incentive contracts (while possibly also increasing workers’ pro-
ductivity), which in turn raises the critical productivity level above which a worker
will select into a performance-based contract.
We then ask how these changes feed into the choice of an optimal indirectly-
progressive tax rate. The wider spread in market returns that follows from globaliza-
tion causes the choice of higher-productivity, performance-based contracts over lower-
productivity, fixed-wage contracts to become more responsive to tax changes, making
tax revenues more tax-elastic and thus raising the efficiency cost of redistribution. The
redistributive value of the tax also rises, however, as the destruction of incentive con-
tracts reduces the income of all individuals from redistributed tax revenues.
4Lemieux et al. (2009) present evidence for the United States. The prevalence of incentive contracts
in the labor markets of other developed countries is detailed in Section 2 below.
5This is also consistent with the emergence of ‘superstar firms’ that dominate markets worldwide
(Autor et al., 2017).
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When the distribution of ability types is uniform, the trade-off between the higher
efficiency costs and the higher distributive value of the tax does not change along
the ability distribution. This makes the uniform case a natural benchmark case for
our analysis. At the same time, a uniform distribution of ability types is fully capable
of generating a positively skewed distribution of earnings realizations that is consis-
tent with empirically observed distributions. In the uniform case, we show that the
effect of globalization on the redistributive value of the tax is only an indirect effect—
which cannot dominate the direct effect on efficiency costs of the tax. Therefore, eco-
nomic globalization is always associated with a lower optimal tax rate, under both
a revenue-maximization (Rawlsian) and a utilitarian government objective. We also
derive conditions under which our results carry over to alternative type distributions.
Our study is related to several strands of literature. In a domestic context, it relates
to the large literature on the optimal progressivity of wage income taxes (see Diamond
and Saez, 2011, for an overview), and on redistributive income taxation in the presence
of earnings risk (see Boadway and Sato, 2015, for a recent synthesis). Most of this lit-
erature considers earnings volatility as exogenous, driven by luck (Varian, 1980). The
implications of endogenous earnings risk are considered in a small literature strand
that focuses on the ‘crowding out’ of private insurance by social insurance or redis-
tributive taxation (Golosov and Tsyvinski, 2007; Chetty and Saez, 2010; Krueger and
Perri, 2011). Most closely related to our basic setting is Doligalski et al. (2020), who
analyze redistributive taxation in a model of performance pay contracts. Their focus,
however, is on the role of non-linear tax reforms and labor supply responses, rather
than on the effects of international market integration as in our analysis.
A number of recent studies (Lemieux et al., 2009; Abraham et al., 2017) have em-
phasized the contribution of performance-based pay to rising wage inequality, while
a number of older studies (Schmidt, 1997; Raith, 2003) have stressed the role of market
competition in the determination of incentive pay. Our analysis connects these find-
ings to the optimal taxation literature. The effects of economic globalization on optimal
income taxation have so far been studied mainly for environments where high-income
earners are internationally mobile (Simula and Trannoy, 2010; Bierbrauer et al., 2013;
Lehmann et al., 2014; To´bias, 2016).6 These models generally find that economic inte-
gration leads to inefficiently low redistributive income taxes. Here we focus instead
on the global competition in product markets and its effects on performance-based
contracts as an alternative channel through which economic globalization influences
6Empirical contributions to this literature have studied the migration responses of high-income earn-
ers both at the international level (Kleven et al., 2014) and at the national level (e.g., Agrawal and
Foremny (2019). The literature is summarized in Kleven et al. (2020).
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tax policy choices. As we will show, this has implications that are akin to those of in-
troducing ‘superstar effects’ into a model of optimal taxation (Scheuer and Werning,
2017; Scheuer and Slemrod, 2019).
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes available empirical ev-
idence on the prevalence of incentive contracts in labor markets. In Section 3,
we describe the model and study the sorting of heterogeneous worker types into
performance-based versus fixed-wage contracts. Section 4 analyzes how the equilib-
rium structure of contracts is affected by higher taxes and by a globalization-induced
increase in the variance of output realizations. Section 5 turns to redistributive taxa-
tion and analyzes the effects of market integration on the optimal redistributive tax
rate. Section 6 summarizes and discusses our results. Section 7 concludes.
2 The pervasiveness of performance-related incentives
In the most narrow sense, performance-based contracts can be distinguished by an
explicit bonus element that is paid on the basis of measured performance. Such bonus
contracts play an important role in all OECD countries, particularly at the top of the in-
come distribution. For the UK example, Bell and Van Reenen (2014) show that bonus
income represents more than 10% of the total salary for the top 10% of earners em-
ployed in financial services, and for the top 5% of earners in other sectors. This share
rises steeply for top salary earners: for the top percentile, bonuses make up 44% of
total pay in financial services, and 35% of total pay in other sectors.7 More generally,
Lemieux et al. (2009) find for a panel of more than 3,000 employees in the United
States that almost 40% of workers receive some form of performance pay. In other
OECD countries, the share of incentive contracts is somewhat lower, but still above
20% (Bryson et al., 2012).
In a broader interpretation, many employed individuals who do not explicitly
receive bonuses still face implicit performance-related incentives: Fama (1980) and
Holmstrom (1999) have emphasized the role of implicit incentive contracts in a dy-
namic setting where satisfactory performance of a worker today is rewarded by pro-
motions and a higher (nominally fixed) pay tomorrow. The importance of such im-
plicit incentives has been empirically confirmed with both field and experimental data
(Frederikse n, 2013; Sliwka and Werner, 2017).8
7There is an active discussion of whether these bonus contracts reflect “rent extraction” by CEOs
(Piketty et al., 2014), or are compatible with modern shareholder value theories (Edmans and Gabaix,
2016). Our discussion restricts attention to the productivity enhancing effects of incentive contracts.
8In a still broader interpretation, every employment contract can be regarded as a performance-
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Incentives that are analogous to those in performance-based contracts are also
present for the self-employed. In the EU, this group accounts for 15% of all employed
individuals; the corresponding figure for the US is 6.5% (OECD).9 Models of occupa-
tional choice (Lucas, 1978; Boadway et al., 1991) interpret this group as high-ability
individuals who efficiently self-select into self-employment and in many ways face
similar incentives as top-earning employees within incentive contracts.
There are several indications that the importance of (broadly-defined)
performance-related incentives has increased in recent decades. Lemieux et al.
(2009) find that the number of incentive pay contracts in the United States has
increased over the period from the mid-1970s to the late 1990s, emphasizing that
the increase has primarily occurred at the top of the income distribution. Similarly,
Bryson et al. (2012) document an increase in the share of performance-related pay
in both Europe and the United States in the 2000s, primarily in higher-earning jobs.
Moreover, rising intra-occupational wage inequality, for example in the United States
(Heathcote et al., 2010) and in Germany (Bayer and Kuhn, 2019), can be seen as
indirect evidence for a rising importance of implicit incentive contracts in a dynamic
career perspective.
The pervasiveness of a performance-based component in individuals’ income
streams implies that the distribution of income is, at least in part, shaped by the
stochastic structure of contractual arrangements rather than just by ability differen-
tials.10 As we will show, this has direct implications for how income-based redis-
tributive policies should be assessed, and for how redistributive policies respond to
changes in the structure of incentives.
based contract when job insecurity and unemployment are taken into account. In recent decades, job
protection has generally been reduced, both by changes in labour market laws and through reductions
in support payments for the unemployed, in particular by cutting the duration of unemployment ben-
efits. From an individual worker’s perspective, these changes translate into an increased income gap
between a ‘successful outcome’ where (s)he stays in the job, and an ‘unsuccessful’ outcome, where (s)he
is fired from the job and has to rely on social support payments. The widespread use of customer rat-
ings to measure performance for low-earning service providers in the gig economy is also consistent
with this interpretation.
9https://data.oecd.org/emp/self-employment-rate.htm. Eurofound (2017) gives a detailed
breakdown of the self-employed in the EU and finds that about half of the self-employed are profes-
sionals or business owners with high incomes – a group that also tends to be immobile internationally
(cf. footnote 3). See also Hamilton (2000) for one of the few empirical studies on the returns to self-
employment in the United States.
10Abraham et al. (2017) find that incentive contracts contribute about 10% of the observed US wage
inequality.
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3 A model of incomplete contracting
3.1 Preferences, technologies, and incentives
We consider an economy populated by a unit mass of individuals who are ex-ante
identical (at time τ = 0) and are risk averse, with von Neumann-Morgenstern utility,
u(x), from consumption, x, satisfying u′(x) > 0 and u′′(x) < 0. For tractability, the rest
of our analysis will focus on the logarithmic case u(x) = ln x, which exhibits falling
absolute risk aversion and constant relative risk aversion.
At time τ = 1 each individual is assigned a productivity type, α, drawn from a
continuous distribution with positive support [0, α] and cumulative density function
F(α). As the number of individuals is large, F(α) also coincides with the c.d.f. of the
ex-post distribution of productivity types in the population. Without loss of generality,
we assume α = 1.
Production takes place through risky projects that are run by risk-neutral firms op-
erating under conditions of perfect competition. Each project involves a single individ-
ual, hired by a firm as a worker. A project that employs an individual of productivity
type α yields output
α
pi
, pi ∈ (0, 1) , (1)
if successful and yields zero output if unsuccessful (irrespective of the individual’s
productivity type). The probability, γ(e), of the project being successful depends on
the individual’s chosen level of effort, e ∈ {0, 1}, as follows:
γ(e) = epi + (1− e) ηpi , (2)
with η ∈ (0, 1). Hence, the probability of success is pi with positive effort but it is
only ηpi < pi if no effort is exerted. From (1), the expected output from a worker of
productivity type α (gross of effort costs) is then
γ(e)
α
pi
= eα+ (1− e) ηα ; (3)
i.e. it is equal to the individual productivity type, α, if the individual exerts positive
effort, but is reduced to ηα < α if the individual exerts no effort.
Effort is costly: the individual incurs a private utility cost ce, c > 0, irrespective
of her productivity type. For the remainder of our discussion, we shall assume that, if
the individual could secure an income equal to her expected output in all states, then
exerting positive effort would be always preferred to exerting no effort. This implies
ln α− c > ln ηα, which in turn requires
c < − ln η ≡ c . (4)
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A worker’s productivity type is publicly observable, and so is output. Effort, how-
ever, is not observable (or, if it is observable, it is not verifiable), which implies that
wage payments cannot be directly conditioned on effort. Contracting between firms
and workers thus runs against a fundamental moral hazard problem, which can only
be (partially) addressed by an incentive-compatible contract that induces workers to
exert effort by conditioning the wage payment on output. This implies a performance-
based contract prescribing two different gross-of-tax wage levels: a higher wage, wH,
paid if the project is successful, and a lower wage, wL, if the project is unsuccessful.
The lower wage level can be thought of as a base wage, with the higher wage level
adding a bonus, wH − wL, to the base wage contingent on success.
Income is taxed at rate t, and revenues from the tax are distributed equally amongst
the population in lump-sum fashion, i.e. through a uniform transfer that individuals
take as exogenous. As the population has unit mass, the uniform transfer equals total
tax revenue, g. This is an indirectly progressive, linear income tax scheme that collects
comparatively more tax revenues from higher earners while redistributing all pro-
ceeds on an equal per-capita basis. It is also an anonymous scheme, in the sense that
the tax an individual pays and the transfer she receives are not conditioned on her
type (whether or not that can be observed by the tax planner) but only depends on her
income.11
Given this tax/transfer scheme, if an individual receives a gross wage income
equal to w, her net-of-tax wage income is wN = (1 − t)w and her total disposable
income is (1− t)w + g, which must equal consumption, x. A worker’s expected util-
ity from such a contract, if she chooses to exert positive effort, is thus
pi ln
(
(1− t)wH + g
)
+ (1− pi) ln ((1− t)wL + g)− c ≡ EUE. (5a)
If zero effort is chosen, expected utility from the incentive contract is instead12
ηpi ln
(
(1− t)wH + g
)
+ (1− ηpi) ln ((1− t)wL + g) ≡ EUN. (5b)
In order to induce positive effort from workers, performance-based contracts must
satisfy the incentive-compatibility constraint EUE ≥ EUN. Competitive firms will
choose the contract that involves the lowest expected wage cost to them and still in-
duces workers to exert effort. Hence, EUE = EUN must hold in a competitive equilib-
11The focus on linear income taxation differentiates our model from related work that assumes a
non-linear income tax schedule (e.g. Lehmann et al., 2014; Doligalski et al., 2020).
12Note that workers’ utility in this no-effort incentive contract will generally differ from utility in the
(no-effort) fixed wage contract, as given in (11) below.
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rium. Equating expected utilities in (5a) and (5b) gives
(1− t)wH + g
(1− t)wL + g = e
c
pi (1−η) ≡ Γ > 1 . (6)
Condition (6) determines the equilibrium spread between the high wage, wH, and the
low wage, wL, that just induces effort. The expected level of worker remuneration is
then pinned down by the free entry and exit of risk-neutral firms under perfect com-
petition. This implies that expected profits for a firm offering a performance-based
contract to a worker of productivity type α (who will exert positive effort in equilib-
rium) must be zero:
α− (pi wH + (1− pi)wL) ≡ EΠE = 0 . (7)
The zero-profit condition (7) and the incentive-compatibility constraint (6) jointly de-
termine the equilibrium levels of gross-of-tax wages in each of the two states, as func-
tions of the productivity type, α, and of the tax/transfer scheme (t, g):
wL =
α− pi (Γ− 1) g/(1− t)
1+ pi (Γ− 1) , (8a)
wH =
αΓ+ (1− pi) (Γ− 1) g/(1− t)
1+ pi (Γ− 1) , (8b)
where Γ has been introduced in (6). From (8a) and (8b) we see that both state-
contingent wage levels are rising in the worker’s productivity level, α.
By (7), in a performance-based contract each worker must receive her full produc-
tivity, α, as her expected gross wage. However, in order to induce effort, this needs to
be delivered in the form of a lottery that leaves the worker exposed to income risk:
since Γ > 1, the high wage, wH, is always above the expected productivity, α, of a
worker who exerts effort, whereas the low wage, wL, is below the worker’s expected
productivity. Given that workers are risk-averse and firms are risk-neutral (and there-
fore capable, in principle, to insure workers at no cost), such an outcome is inefficient.
Firms can, alternatively, offer workers fixed-wage contracts that fully insure the
worker, paying the same wage level, wF, in all contingencies, whether or not the
project is successful.13 But then the firm must fully anticipate that, absent any incen-
tive for workers to exert positive effort, workers of any productivity type will choose
13The choice between performance-based and fixed-wage contracts in the model is a stylized repre-
sentation of what would in reality be a choice within a continuum of possible contract structures all
featuring some performance-based element to a greater or lesser extent. Here we just restrict the con-
tract choice to the two endpoints of this distribution. From this perspective, fixed-wage employment
contracts that do not provide full job security would correspond to some combination between these
two extremes rather than to what we call here a “fixed-wage contract”.
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to exert zero effort. From (3), expected output will thus only be ηα. Under conditions
of perfect competition, expected firm profits under this contract must also be zero:
ηα− wF ≡ EΠF = 0 , (9)
which implies a fixed pre-tax wage rate
wF = ηα . (10)
Expected utility for a worker of type α in a fixed-wage contract will thus equal
ln
(
(1− t) ηα+ g) ≡ EUF. (11)
By (4), exerting positive effort is productively efficient. So, a fixed-wage contract re-
moves the welfare cost associated with income risk but replaces it with a welfare cost
that comes from inefficient production choices.
3.2 Contract choice and the distribution of income
A performance-based contract will only be selected if it yields a higher expected utility
than a fixed-wage contract does, i.e. if EUE > EUF. Since EUE must equal EUN in
equilibrium, we can directly compare EUN to EUF.
Replacing the expression for wL from (8a) into (5b), using (11), and differentiating
EUN − EUF with respect to α, we obtain
∂(EUN − EUF)
∂α
=
(1− t)(1− η) g(
(1− t) α+ g)((1− t) ηα+ g) > 0 . (12)
Therefore, if EUN ≥ EUF for a productivity type α′, this must also be true for produc-
tivity types α ≥ α′; and if EUN < EUF for a productivity type α′′, this must also be
true for productivity types α < α′′. Equating EUN with EUF, and solving for α, we
obtain
α =
g
(1− t)K ≡ αˆ , K ≡ −
η
(
1+ pi (Γ− 1))− Γηpi
1+ pi (Γ− 1) − Γηpi , (13)
where K is positive for η < 1 and c sufficiently low.14 Because of (12), the critical
value αˆ partitions the range of productivity types into two intervals: all workers with
a productivity level α < αˆ will choose the fixed-wage contract and exert zero effort,
and workers with a productivity level α ≥ αˆ will choose a performance-based contract
and exert positive effort.
14See the proof of Proposition 1.
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A relevant constraint for performance-based contracts is that the low wage, wL,
cannot become negative. This constraint is always satisfied in our model (Lemma 1 in
Appendix B.1).
We summarize the properties of the equilibrium contract structure in the following
result:
Proposition 1. For any given combination of tax and transfer, and for effort cost, c, lying
below a positive threshold c˜ < c, there exists a productivity level, αˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that:
- individuals with productivity types α ≥ αˆ will select into performance-based contracts
with state-contingent wage levels, wH and wL, as given in (8a)-(8b), and will exert
positive effort;
- individuals of productivity types α < αˆ will receive a fixed wage wF = ηα and will exert
no effort.
PROOF: See Appendix B.2.
Our result that performance-based contracts are concentrated among high-ability
individuals is aligned with the empirical evidence. Bell and Van Reenen (2014, Fig-
ure 3) document a strong and positive relationship between the percentile of earners
in the U.K. wage distribution, and their bonus share in the total pay. Similarly, Lemieux
et al. (2009, Table 1) show that hourly earnings of U.S. employees were 30% higher in
performance-pay jobs, as compared to non-performance-pay jobs.
In equilibrium, realized ex-post, pre-tax wages will reflect both the heterogeneous
abilities of individuals and, for those in an incentive contract, the stochastic nature
of the production process. For each productivity type α < αˆ, all individuals of that
type will receive a wage wF, whereas for each productivity type α ≥ αˆ, a fraction pi of
individuals of that type will receive a wage wH and a fraction 1− pi of individuals of
that type will receive a wage wL. Let w−1F (w), w
−1
L (w) and w
−1
H (w) denote the inverse
mappings from wage realizations to productivity types, α, corresponding respectively
to (10), (8a) and (8b):
w−1F (w) = w/η ; (14)
w−1L (w) = w + pi (Γ− 1)
(
w + g/(1− t)) ; (15)
w−1H (w) =
w−1L (w)− (Γ− 1) g/(1− t)
Γ
. (16)
We can then describe the entire distribution of realized, pre-tax wage incomes in the
economy as a mixture of three component distributions:
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(i) a distribution with c.d.f. F
(
w−1F (w)
)
/F(αˆ) over the support [0, αˆ/η] and mixture
weight F(αˆ);
(ii) a distribution with c.d.f. F
(
w−1L (w)
)
/
(
1− F(αˆ)) over the support (wL(αˆ), wL(1)]
and mixture weight (1− pi) (1− F(αˆ)).
(iii) a distribution with c.d.f. F
(
w−1H (w)
)
/
(
1 − F(αˆ)) over the support
(wH(αˆ), wH(1)] and mixture weight pi
(
1− F(αˆ)).
Figures 1 and 2 provide an illustrative example, assuming a uniform distribution of
productivity types. Figure 1 gives the wage realizations by productivity type. For the
given parameters, the critical value, αˆ, is approximately 0.32. Individuals just below
this type receive a fixed wage of about 0.25, whereas individuals marginally above αˆ
receive a high wage of 0.6 with probability 0.4, and a low wage of 0.12 with proba-
bility 0.6. Figure 2 plots the distribution of pre-tax wages for the same example. Note
that even though the distribution of productivity types is uniform, the resulting dis-
tribution of pre-tax wages is not, with a large mass of low earners at the bottom of the
distribution and a fat tail of high earners.
4 Taxation, market integration, and the equilibrium
structure of contracts
We next examine how changes in the economic environment that are exogenous to
agents’ decisions, namely a change in the tax/redistribution scheme and a change in
output volatility caused by market integration, are reflected in the equilibrium struc-
ture of contracts and the distribution of pre-tax wages. In the next section we will build
on these results to examine how the choice of an optimal redistributive tax is affected
by an increase in output risk.
4.1 Taxation and contract choice
We first analyze the effects of changing the wage income tax rate on the cutoff produc-
tivity level αˆ in (13). With K > 0, it is straightforward to establish that
∂αˆ
∂t
=
g
(1− t)2K =
αˆ
1− t > 0,
∂αˆ
∂g
=
1
(1− t)K =
αˆ
g
> 0. (17)
An increase in the tax, t, for g > 0, raises the critical productivity level αˆ below which
workers select low-output, fixed-wage contracts. This result corresponds to the stan-
dard labor supply distortion in models with continuous effort choice (Doligalski et al.,
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Figure 1: Wage realizations by productivity type
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Figure 2: Distribution of pre-tax wages
12
��
��
��
t = 0.5
t = 0.65
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 α
0.5
1.0
1.5
�
With pi = 2/5, η = 4/5, c = c/5, F(α) = α
Figure 3: Contract responses to tax changes
2020), as the fixed-wage contract substitutes leisure in exchange for a higher expected
wage. An increase in the transfer, g, also raises αˆ, because it reduces the marginal util-
ity of wage income.
The transfer, g, and the tax rate, t, are linked through the government budget con-
straint:
g = t Q, Q = η
∫ αˆ(t,g)
0
αdF(α) +
∫ 1
αˆ(t,g)
αdF(α), (18)
where we have written αˆ(t, g) to highlight the dependence of αˆ on t and g. The tax base,
Q, consists of the expected output of all workers, which are employed either under a
fixed-wage contract without effort (the first term in Q), or under a performance-based
contract with effort (the second term).
From (17), αˆ is increasing in both t and g and the analysis of a change in t must
incorporate the induced change in the transfer g. It can never be optimal, however, to
select a tax rate at a level such that the total derivative of g with respect to t, dg/dt
is negative. Then, in the relevant range of rationalizable tax rate choices, t and g must
be positively related. Therefore, an increase in the tax will unambiguously raise αˆ, i.e.
dαˆ/dt > 0, and thus lower the total income tax base in (18). This is summarized in:
Proposition 2. Consider two tax levels t′ and t′′ > t′, with αˆ′′ ∈ (0, 1) denoting a produc-
tivity type that is indifferent between the two forms of contracts under t = t′′. Then the range
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of productivity types that select into performance-based contracts is narrower under t′′ than
under t′, and the tax base is also smaller.
To illustrate, Figure 3 incorporates the same parameterization as in Figures 1 and 2,
but with a higher tax rate, t = 0.65, up from t = 0.5.15 There are now more productivity
types selecting into fixed-wage contracts (about 57% of them, up from 32%), resulting
in a reduction in the tax base (by an amount f (α) (1− η) α for each productivity type
that switches from one contract form to the other). Those productivity types that do
select into performance-based contracts now face a larger variation in pre-tax income.
This is because contracts respond to offset the tax change by increasing the pre-tax
wage differential, wH − wL, in order to still induce effort under the higher tax rate.
4.2 Income volatility, contracts, and the distribution of income
Consider next the effects of an increase in the spread of output realizations. In our
formalization, output in the favourable state for a project employing an individual of
productivity α and exerting positive effort is α/pi whereas output in the unfavourable
state is zero. A decrease in the parameter pi thus amounts to a mean-preserving spread
in the returns to effort, which leaves expected output unchanged at α while raising
output risk.
Such a change can be interpreted as being associated with economic globalization.
Appendix A presents a fully specified model that rationalizes this interpretation. In
short, if ex-ante identical firms compete in any given market and face idiosyncratic
cost shocks, there will be realizations in which the most productive firm will be able to
capture the entire market, while other firms are left with a zero market share. Market
integration gives each firm access to a larger combined market with more competitors.
This increases the amount of revenues a firm can obtain if it manages to capture the
larger market, but it makes such an event comparatively less likely because of the
larger number of competitors. The question we want to address then is how greater
product market integration, which we model here simply as a decrease in pi, affects
the equilibrium choice of contracts.
From (13), the critical value αˆ is decreasing in K, which in turn can be shown to
be increasing in pi (see (B.1) in the appendix). Intuitively, a lower success probability
pi raises the risk involved in a performance-based contract, making this contract less
attractive to risk-averse workers, in comparison to a fixed-wage contract. From (8b),
15Note that in both cases, the maximum average tax rate is much lower, peaking at about 34% for the
highest-ability individual (α = 1) with t = 0.5 and at about 46% with t = 0.65.
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we can also see that the high wage level, wH, in a performance-based contract is rising
when pi falls. It immediately follows from this that a decrease in pi must unambigu-
ously increase the fraction of total income that accrues to a subset of high earners in
favorable realizations:
Proposition 3. For a given t, consider a reduction in the success probability of all projects
from pi′ to pi′′ < pi′, with αˆ′′ ∈ (0, 1) denoting a productivity type that is indifferent between
the two forms of contracts under pi = pi′′. Then:
i. the range of productivity types that select into performance based contracts is narrower
under pi′′ than under pi′ (αˆ′′ > αˆ′), and the tax base is also smaller;
ii. the fraction of pre-tax income accruing to income recipients above a certain percentile
threshold, p′′, in the distribution of ex-post, pre-tax income is greater under pi′′ than
under pi′.
PROOF: See Appendix B.3.
In qualitative terms, the effect of a mean-preserving spread in the returns to effort
associated with greater product market integration (a fall in pi), will be analogous to
that of an increase in t: it will reduce the range of productivity types that select into in-
centive contracts and raise the dispersion of pre-tax wages within incentive contracts.
This model implication is consistent with the empirical evidence that economic glob-
alization increases wage inequality (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007; Dreher and Gaston,
2008).16 It is also consistent with evidence showing that stronger import competition
in global markets increases the sensitivity of performance-based contracts and leads
to a shift in the pay structure away from fixed pay and towards performance-related
pay (Cun˜at and Guadaloupe, 2009).
Figure 4 incorporates the same parameterization as in Figures 1 and 2, but with
a lower probability of success, pi = 0.3, down from pi = 0.4. The critical productiv-
ity level below which individuals select into a fixed-wage contract has risen to about
0.49. Figure 5 shows how the distribution of pre-tax wages has become more concen-
trated. For pi = 0.3, bonus recipients are those above the 85th percentile of the income
distribution (αˆ ≈ 0.49 ⇒ pi (1− F(αˆ)) ≈ 0.15). The fraction of total pre-tax income
accruing to them is approximately 46%. The corresponding figure for earners above
16Dorn et al. (2018) have recently re-examined the link between globalization and income inequality
for 140 countries over the period 1970-2014. They find a robust positive relationship between globaliza-
tion and wage inequality for most countries, including China and Eastern Europe, though the effect is
not significant for the most advanced economies.
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Figure 5: Output volatility and income concentration
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the 85th percentile of the distribution when pi = 0.4 is lower, at approximately 36%.
Approximate values of the Gini coefficient for pi = 0.4 and pi = 0.3 are respectively
0.39 and 0.45.
In our discussion, we have characterized the effect of economic globalization in
product markets as exclusively consisting of an increase in the variance of outcomes
for individual projects. However, the same conclusions continue to apply if, addition-
ally, globalization also results in an increase in productivity.17 To see this, take the
distribution of productivity types in our model, which has a support [0, 1], to repre-
sent the ‘baseline’ distribution. Now suppose that globalization results in an economy-
wide, type-neutral productivity shift that increases the productivity of each worker by
a factor λ > 1. Further, let the cutoff productivity of the individual that is indifferent
between contract types before globalization (scenario 0), for a tax rate t0 and tax rev-
enue g0, be αˆ0. After globalization, the productivity of this same type is λαˆ0. If this
individual is also the cut-off productivity type following globalization (scenario 1), so
that αˆ1 = λαˆ0, then the model remains structurally unchanged. For an unchanged tax
rate, t1 = t0, total tax revenues will then equal g1 = λg0 (as the income of all workers
is multiplied by λ, irrespective of contract type); and from (13) we see that the condi-
tion αˆ1 = λαˆ0 = λg0/((1− t)K) will indeed be met if the tax rate remains the same.18
We argue below that there is indeed no reason for the tax rate to change in scenario 1.
It follows that our problem is fully invariant to uniform changes in the productivity
of all types. Hence, all the results derived in our analysis continue to hold if, in addi-
tion to increasing the volatility of output for each worker, the globalization of product
markets also leads to productivity gains.
5 Optimal redistributive taxation and economic global-
ization
We now turn to our main question—how the choice of redistributive taxes is affected
by an increase in output risk brought about by market integration.
Since agents are risk-averse in our model and firms are risk-neutral, optimal con-
17The model we present in Appendix A, which provides microfoundations for our interpretation of
higher output risk as being equivalent to product market integration, does predict a positive produc-
tivity shift.
18With logarithmic utility, the trade-off between the fixed wage contract and the incentive contract
remains unaffected when incomes under both contract types increase proportionally and effort costs in
the incentive contract stay nominally unchanged.
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tracts under full information (i.e. with effort being observable) would be directly con-
ditioned on effort and would fully eliminate income risk for workers. Under asymmet-
ric information, performance-based contracts that impose risks on risk-averse agents
arise endogenously, by deliberate design, as a second-best market remedy. As a result,
the linear income tax cannot play any role in mitigating this risk.19
By redistributing income between different productivity types, linear income taxes
can still insure individuals against their individual productivity draw.20 Income based
taxation, however, restricts redistribution to be conditioned on income realizations
rather than on productivity types. In a setting where workers in an incentive con-
tract face income volatility, the ranking of realized earnings does not fully reflect the
ranking of productivity types. By redistributing from ex-post high earners to ex-post
low earners the indirectly progressive income tax achieves redistribution “on average”
from high-productivity to low-productivity types, thus providing ex-ante insurance
against adverse productivity draws. But it does so at the cost of interfering with con-
tract design: a linear income tax that reduces the after-tax wage gap in the two states
of the world will require a correspondingly higher before-tax wage differential for the
contract to remain incentive-compatible. This, in turn, will put a break on redistribu-
tion.21
A change in output risk caused by economic globalization will affect the extent
to which contract choices respond to taxes and will thus be reflected in the level of
redistributive taxation that is optimally selected by the tax planner.
5.1 Revenue maximization
A natural starting point for studying how changes in the economic environment trans-
late into changes in tax policy choices is the case where a government aims at maximiz-
ing tax revenues. Revenue maximization is consistent with the government pursuing
19This corresponds to the finding that social insurance leads to a crowding-out of private insurance
(e.g. Chetty and Saez, 2010).
20The optimal income tax literature often distinguishes between an insurance role of the income tax,
which reduces the variance of exogenous earnings risk for a given productivity type, and a redistributive
role, which reduces the after-tax variation in the incomes of different productivity types. See Boadway
and Sato (2015) for a theoretical survey and Hoynes and Luttmer (2011) for an empirical analysis dis-
tinguishing the insurance and redistributive effects of state tax-and-transfer programmes in the United
States. In this paper we interpret the redistributive role of the income tax equivalently as an insurance
against individual productivity draws.
21In the following analysis, we restrict attention to interior optima. This requires that the productiv-
ity gap between fixed-wage and performance-wage contracts is sufficiently large (i.e., η is sufficiently
below unity) that it is never optimal for the government to opt for a confiscatory tax rate (t = 1).
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redistribution under a Rawlsian social welfare objective where only the utility level of
the least well-off type enters as an argument. In an economy where the lowest produc-
tivity type receives no wage income under either contract (α = 0), this is the same as
maximizing tax revenues and hence the per-capita transfer that can be redistributed
to all individuals, including the least well-off.22
From (18), the first-order condition for a revenue-maximizing tax rate, t∗, is
dg
dt∗
= Q + t∗ dQ
dt∗
= 0, (19)
where
dQ
dt
= −(1− η) f (αˆ) αˆ dαˆ
dt
;
dαˆ
dt
=
∂αˆ
∂t
+
∂αˆ
∂g
dg
dt
> 0 , (20)
where the expression for ∂αˆ/∂t > 0 is given in (17), and dg/dt in (20) vanishes at an
optimum.
In order to examine how market integration, modelled as an exogenous reduction
in pi, affects the optimal tax rate t∗, it is sufficient to focus on expression K in (13)—
since pi enters (19) and (20) only through K. From (B.1) in the appendix, K is positively
related to pi. Relying on the implicit function theorem and assuming the second-order
condition for an optimum to hold,23 we get, at t = t∗:
dt
dK
=
d2g/(dt dK)
d2g/dt2
⇒ sign
(
dt
dK
)
= sign
(
d2g
dt dK
)
.
Differentiating (19) with respect to K yields (see Appendix B.4):
d2g
dt dK
= Φ
(
f (αˆ) +
t
1− t
(
f ′(αˆ) αˆ+ 2 f (αˆ)
))
, (21)
where Φ ≡ (1− η) αˆ g/(K ((1− t)K + t (1− η) f (αˆ) αˆ)) > 0. The expression on the
right-hand side of (21) is positive if the sum of terms in parentheses is positive, i.e. if
∂ f (αˆ)
∂α
αˆ
f (αˆ)
≡ ξ f ,α ≥ −1+ tt . (22)
22From an ex-ante perspective, the tax planner’s objective in this case does not coincide with the ex-
ante expected utility of an individual as implied by an expectation over u(xαs)− eαc, with s ∈ {0, 1}
denoting the output-relevant state. Rather, it corresponds to a case where individuals exhibit ex-ante
infinite risk aversion, which corresponds to an ex-ante expected utility equal to minα,s
{
u(xαs)− eαc
}
.
23The second-order condition is met if revenue is concave in t, i.e. if 2 dQ/dt + t d2Q/dt2 < 0; or
−t(d2Q/dt2)/(dQ/dt) < 2. Using the fact that dg/dt = 0 at an optimum, this can be shown to require
ξ f ,α < 1 + 2/t. This condition is always met by a distribution of ability types such that f ′(α) ≤ 0
(sufficiency).
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A sufficient condition for this to be satisfied for all values of t ∈ (0, 1) is ξ f ,α > −2. If
this condition is met, then globalization (a reduction in pi) will lower the equilibrium
tax rate t∗. This will be the case when f (α) is either non-decreasing, or only moder-
ately decreasing in the productivity type α. Condition (22) will always be fulfilled, for
example, under a uniform distribution of productivity types, where f ′(αˆ) = 0.24
A mean-preserving output spread thus causes the efficiency costs of taxation to
rise, as incentive contracts respond more sensitive to taxation. Intuitively, a fall in pi
increases income volatility in a performance-based contract and increases the cutoff
productivity level, αˆ, above which workers select into this contract. At the higher level
of αˆ, the level of the tax base is reduced and the remaining tax base responds more
strongly to taxation. Both of these effects imply that the elasticity ε = (t/Q)(dQ/dt)
with which the tax base responds to a change in the tax rate tends to increase in ab-
solute value. This increase in the elasticity of the tax base is similar to models where
the high-income workers are internationally mobile (Lehmann et al., 2014). The mech-
anism, however, is entirely different—there is no inter-jurisdictional factor mobility in
our model.
Under revenue maximization, the optimal tax rate will therefore fall unless, at the
higher level of αˆ, there are substantially fewer workers whose contract choice is dis-
torted by the tax. Since the government is only concerned with the ex-post welfare of
the poorest individual, any changes in the insurance role that the indirectly progres-
sive income tax takes in our model, are not relevant under this objective function.
We summarize our results in this section in the following proposition:
Proposition 4. A mean-preserving spread in output realizations (a fall in pi) reduces the
revenue-maximizing tax rate: (i) if the distribution of productivity types is uniform; (ii) for
any distribution of types that fulfills condition (22).
PROOF: See Appendix B.4.
Note that if we additionally associate globalization with a positive, proportional
productivity shift, as discussed at the end of Section 3, this has no effect on the opti-
mal tax under a revenue-maximizing objective: in (19), both Q and dQ/dt∗ are multi-
24Condition (22) refers to the distribution of productivity types and does not imply a condition on
the distribution of realized wages. The latter results in our setting from a mixture of distributions of
type-specific distributions of wage realizations (cf. Section 3.2). In a generalized version of our model
where the type-specific distributions of wage realizations are continuous (e.g. Pareto), the shape and
tail behaviour of the overall distribution of realized wages (e.g. a Pareto tail) would thus be inherited
from the shape of the type-specific distributions, not from the shape of the distribution of productivity
types.
20
plied by a common productivity shift factor in this case, leaving the optimal tax rate
unchanged.
Once more, it is worth emphasizing that the uniform distribution of types singled
out in Proposition 4 does not imply a uniform distribution of incomes. Rather, it gen-
erates a right tail as only some of the highest-productivity workers will be successful,
and these receive high bonus payments in equilibrium. Moreover, this right tail be-
comes fatter as market integration increases, as fewer high-productivity workers will
achieve comparatively greater success.
5.2 Utilitarian objective
A utilitarian social welfare function can be written as
W =
∫ αˆ
0
EUF(α)dF(α) +
∫ 1
αˆ
EUE(α)dF(α) . (23)
The first term on the right-hand side sums over the expected utilities of workers with
a fixed wage contract, whereas the second term represents workers with an incentive
contract. This is a non-trivial change from the Rawlsian case (revenue maximization),
because now all individuals, with different types of contracts, enter the government’s
objective.
Since EUE(αˆ) = EUF(αˆ) (by the definition of αˆ), the first-order condition for a
welfare-maximizing tax rate can be written as
dW
dt
=
∫ αˆ
0
dEUF(α)
dt
dF(α) +
∫ 1
αˆ
dEUE(α)
dt
dF(α) = 0 . (24)
Expanding the terms, dEUZ(α)/dt, Z ∈ {E, F}, we can express them as (see Appendix
B.5)
dEU(α)
dt
=
dg/dt− b(α) α
g + (1− t) b(α) α , (25)
with b(α) = η for α < αˆ and b(α) = 1 for α ≥ αˆ. Just by inspecting (25) and (24), we can
conclude that, since b(α) > 0 for all α, we must have dg/dt > 0 at an optimum. Thus,
under a utilitarian objective the optimal tax falls short of the level that maximizes tax
revenues.25 As noted earlier, a welfare-maximizing tax could never exceed the level at
which revenues are maximized, and will only reach that level when the redistribution
motive is at its strongest—under a Rawlsian objective.
25The Rawlsian case corresponds to b(α) = 1 for α = 0 and b(α) = 0 for all α > 0; (24) then becomes
(dg/dt)/g = 0.
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To understand how a mean-preserving spread in output realizations (a reduction
in pi) is reflected in the optimal choice of tax, note first that all effects only flow through
the induced increase in the cutoff productivity αˆ. In the absence of a change in αˆ, there
would be no change in dg/dt (nor in g), nor would there be any change in the b(α)
terms that enter expression (25).26 With a change in αˆ, on the other hand, there are two
separate effects on (25)—and hence on the optimality condition for the tax rate chosen
by a utilitarian planner.
The first effect, how dg/dt changes following a reduction in pi, is the same as for
the revenue-maximizing case in (21): a fall in pi makes the tax base respond more elas-
tically to a tax increase, thus lowering dg/dt. The new element under a utilitarian
objective comes from a change in the redistributive effect of the tax. This has two com-
ponents. First, a fall in tax revenues (g) lowers the denominator in (25). While this is
true for all individuals, the relative importance of this effect is higher for lower-ability
types—more specifically, those for which the numerator in (25) is positive at an opti-
mum. There is a further effect, operating through the second term in the numerator
of (25): the switch in contract form for the marginal type αˆ causes the tax base for that
type—a comparatively lower ability type–to fall from αˆ to ηαˆ. Both effects work to
raise the attractiveness of tax-funded redistributive transfers.
The intuition behind these effects is that there is a ‘leisure’ component of welfare,
having a consumption value equal to (1 − η) α and producing a utility differential
equal to the effort cost c, that at the discontinuity point goes from being untaxed (be-
low αˆ) to being taxed (above αˆ). Since higher-income individuals bear a comparatively
greater tax burden, this adds to the redistributive effectiveness of the tax for a given
αˆ. If then αˆ rises following a decrease in pi, the redistributive effectiveness of the tax
further improves, with comparatively lower productivity types previously above the
threshold now moving below the threshold and benefiting comparatively more from
a higher tax. Other things being equal, this makes a higher tax more attractive to a
utilitarian planner.
Appendix B.6 derives a general condition—analogous to condition (22)—that must
be met for a fall in pi to bring about a fall in the optimal tax rate. This involves a
comparison of a term (capturing the change in the marginal revenue effectiveness of
the tax) that only depends on the level and the slope of f (α) at αˆ with a term (capturing
the change in the re-distributional effectiveness of the tax) that depends on the shape
of f (α) over its full support [0, 1]—a term that is absent in the revenue-maximization
26If there is also a productivity shift, all terms dEU(α)/dt in (25) remain unchanged, as both the
numerator and the denominator on the right-hand side are multiplied by a common factor. Therefore,
the optimal tax rate implied by the first-order condition (24) must again remain unchanged.
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case. This makes the condition more stringent than condition (22), and the more so the
larger is the mass of individuals below αˆ who are positively affected by redistribution
becoming more targeted following an increase in αˆ.
We have the standard optimal income tax argument: the efficiency loss is propor-
tional to the number of workers whose decision is distorted at the margin, whereas
the redistributive value of the tax depends on the total number of individuals who are
positively or negatively affected by the redistribution induced by the tax (Sheshinski,
1972). In the presence of performance contracts, however, we need to apply this logic
to the distribution of expected gross earnings (the αs) rather than to the distribution of
the income realizations, the latter resulting from the scrambling of the former with
an uninsurable stochastic component. For a given observed distribution of income
realizations, the presence of contracts implies a comparatively less bottom-heavy dis-
tribution of α. Hence, other things equal, the effect on the efficiency cost of the tax is
comparatively more likely to dominate the effect on its redistributive value.
It is therefore not difficult to identify scenarios where the first effect remains the
dominating effect and so a decrease in pi unambiguously lowers t∗: this is the case
when the distribution of productivity types is uniform (which, as already noted, can
produce a right-skewed distribution of earnings realizations). The uniform case is a
natural benchmark case because it implies that the trade-off between the efficiency
costs of the tax and its redistributive value does not change along the ability distribu-
tion, and so changes in K affect the efficiency costs and the redistributive value of the
tax in the same proportion.
To characterize the optimal tax response to a change in pi for the uniform case, we
proceed in the same way as in the previous section: assuming that the second-order
condition for an optimum is satisfied and relying on the positive relationship between
K and pi in (B.1), the effect of a change in pi on the optimal tax rate has the same
sign as d2W/(dt dK). With a uniform distribution of ability types, this is given by (see
Appendix B.7):
d2W
dt dK
=
(1− t) (1− η)K(
(1− t)K + µ) µ
(
t2
K
(
1
(K + µ)
+
2
(1− t)K
)
− 1
(K + 1) (K + η)
)
. (26)
where µ ≡ √(1− t)2K2 + (1− η) t2 > 0. The first bracketed term in (26) gives the
higher efficiency costs of the tax. This term is always positive and is rising in the tax
rate t. The negative second term in the bracket gives the higher redistributive value of
the tax. The appendix then proceeds to prove that the first effect always dominates the
second; which leads to the following result:
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Proposition 5. Under a utilitarian objective, and for a uniform distribution of productiv-
ity types, a mean-preserving spread in output realizations (a fall in pi) reduces the welfare-
maximizing tax rate.
PROOF: See Appendix B.8.
Proposition 5 corresponds to the result in Proposition 4 for the Rawlsian case. With
a uniform distribution of productivity types, our model therefore unambiguously pre-
dicts a negative effect of market integration (characterized here as a mean-preserving
spread in output realizations) on the optimal redistributive income tax rate.
The intuition for this result is as follows. At the increased cutoff value αˆ induced by
globalization (Proposition 3), a tax increase has a larger marginal effect on incentive
contracts (see (17)). When the distribution of ability types is uniform, this translates
into a larger absolute number of incentive contracts being destroyed by a marginal
tax increase, and hence to a larger efficiency cost of the tax. As we have seen from
our discussion of (25) above, the redistributive value of the tax simultaneously rises;
however, the higher redistributive value arises only from the fall in wage income that
is caused by the destruction of incentive contracts. In other words, the increase in the
redistributive value of the tax is an indirect effect that cannot compensate the direct
effect caused by the higher efficiency costs of the tax.
Figures 6 and 7 conclude the example that we have described in the previous sec-
tions, using the same parameterization but now making the level of taxation equal
to its optimum under a utilitarian objective. This optimum rate is approximately 58%
under the baseline value of pi of 0.4. If pi is reduced to 0.3, the optimal tax rate falls
to approximately 51%. Figure 6 shows that the negative effects that the change in pi
has on the number of incentive contracts is largely, though not fully, offset by the re-
duction in the optimal tax rate (cf. Proposition 2). The gap in gross wages earned in
the high and the low state, which is increased by globalization (cf. Figure 4), remains
largely unaffected by the optimal adjustment of the income tax rate.
Figure 7 shows that globalization (a fall in pi) and the optimal adjustment of the
income tax rate unambiguously increase the concentration of after-tax earnings. The
isolated reduction in pi raises, in particular, the concentration in the upper tail of the
distribution of earnings realizations (see also Figure 5). The optimal, downward ad-
justment of the income tax rate increases inequality further by reducing net transfers
to the lower tail of the earnings distribution. The Gini coefficient for after-tax income
is 0.19 in the baseline scenario (pi = 0.4, t = 58%), rising to 0.21 for pi = 0.3 if t remains
at 58%, and rising further to 0.24 if t adjusts to the optimal rate of 51%.27
27Pre-tax earnings also become more concentrated—approximate values of the pre-tax income Gini
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6 Globalization, inequality and redistribution
The predictions we have derived in the previous sections have direct implications for
the relationship between changes in tax policy choices and changes in the distribu-
tion of income, when this relationship is mediated through a change in globalization-
induced income risk, as measured by pi. In Section 4, we have shown that economic
globalization, characterized as a decrease in pi, raises wage inequality and the con-
centration of earnings at the top of the income distribution (Proposition 3). And our
results in Section 5 state that this can be accompanied by a fall in the optimal rate of
redistributive taxation (Propositions 4 and 5).
Our results are thus fully consistent with the simultaneous increase in pre-tax in-
equality and the reduction in redistributive income tax rates that has been documented
in the empirical literature (Immervoll and Richardson, 2011; Egger et al., 2019). In our
model, the decrease in taxation and the increase in earnings inequality are both conse-
quences of structural changes associated with economic globalization.
The increase in income inequality is generated in our model by the wider disper-
sion of pre-tax wages under incentive contracts that can be attributed to increased
competition under market integration. This characterization is consistent with the
increase in between-firm wage inequality that has been documented in the empirical
labour economics literature (Song et al., 2019). If performance incentives are dynami-
cally interpreted, it is also consistent with the observation of rising within-firm inequal-
ity that has been documented in the empirical literature on life-cycle wage dynamics
(Heathcote et al., 2010; Bayer and Kuhn, 2019).
Market integration raises income inequality in our model even when it does not
cause incentive contracts to become widespread—a fall in pi causes the range of pro-
ductivity types selecting into incentive contracts to narrow (i.e. αˆ to fall). But the model
can be extended to account for a rising share of incentive contracts if, in addition to
lowering pi, market integration also results in a positive productivity shift (as dis-
cussed in Section 3.1). If this productivity shift affects only high-ability workers in
incentive contracts but not lower ability types in fixed-wage contracts, then the com-
bination of a reduction in pi and an increase in the productivity of incentive contracts
can cause the optimal tax rate to fall and the share of incentive contracts to rise (i.e. αˆ
to fall).28
coefficient for pi = 0.4 and pi = 0.3 are respectively 0.42 and 0.45.
28An alternative explanation for a rising share of incentive contracts is to introduce monitoring costs
for incentive contracts falling over time as a result of new technological developments (see Lemieux et
al., 2009).
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The fact that globalization induces changes in income inequality differentiates our
analysis from the literature focusing on the increased mobility of high income earn-
ers under labor market integration (Simula and Trannoy, 2010; Bierbrauer et al., 2013;
Lehmann et al., 2014). In these models, changes in optimal non-linear income tax rates
are exclusively driven by efficiency considerations, which are in turn determined by
the level and the slope of the semi-elasticity of migration.29 Our analysis also consid-
ers optimal tax responses that simultaneously weigh changes in the elasticity of the
tax base against changes in the redistributive value of the income tax.
The trade-off between higher efficiency costs and a higher redistributive value of
the income tax is also present in the ‘superstar’ model of Scheuer and Werning (2017),
who show that introducing superstar effects for a given distribution of abilities leaves
the optimal redistributive tax rate constant. This result obtains because the higher re-
distributive gain from the tax is exactly offset by the larger elasticity of the tax base.
Formally, this is directly comparable to the opposing effects that we highlight in our
analysis of utilitarian optima, but our results are different. In our model, the fall in
pi induced by market integration generates an effect analogous to a ‘superstar effect’,
but (under weak conditions) the increase in the elasticity of the tax base dominates
the redistributive gains. One core difference between our analysis and that of Scheuer
and Werning (2017) is that the expected wage of high-ability types does not rise in our
model, even though the observed wage inequality rises. This once again shows that
the importance of redistributive motives is systematically reduced by the presence of
performance pay, and more so the larger is the contribution of incentive contracts to
observed income inequality.
Our analysis captures only a subset of the relevant effects that are associated with
economic globalization. While our results are invariant to an equiproportional change
in productivity levels (as discussed in Section 4.2), a key assumption in our analysis
is that relative productivity levels remain unchanged. To the extent that globalization
raises the relative productivity of high-ability vis-a`-vis low-ability types, the redis-
tributive argument for a progressive income tax is strengthened. Even in this extended
setting, however, the increase in observed income inequality is partly driven by the
higher income spread in incentive contracts, and this part will not give any reason for
increased redistributive taxation.
29In line with their focus on efficiency effects, Simula and Trannoy (2010) and Lehmann et al. (2014)
only consider revenue maximizing governments. Bierbrauer et al. (2013) assume utilitarian govern-
ments, but relocation of all workers is costless in their model. As they show, this makes it impossible to
levy positive taxes on individuals with above-average incomes.
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7 Conclusion
Empirical studies have shown that economic globalization is associated with both an
increase in income inequality and a reduction in the progressivity of income taxes (Eg-
ger et al., 2019). In this paper we have offered an explanation for these simultaneous
developments, which seemingly contradict the predictions of optimal tax theory.
In our model, increased competition in integrated product markets translates into
higher idiosyncratic income risk that performance-based contracts must impose on
high productivity workers to overcome moral hazard. The higher volatility of indi-
vidual earnings makes incentive contracts more sensitive to the disincentive effects
caused by a progressive income tax, raising the efficiency cost of redistributive taxa-
tion. At the same time, redistributive taxation is unable to counter the higher income
inequality that arises endogenously from steeper incentive contracts. As a result, opti-
mal redistributive income tax rates will fall.
Our analysis could be extended in several further directions. One example is to
allow for continuous wage contracts in the context of a continuous distribution of
possible output realizations. Additionally allowing for heterogeneous effects on both
output volatility and productivity across different ability types and occupations could
yield a framework that lends itself to structural estimation in future empirical work.
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Appendix
A Market integration and revenue volatility
In this appendix, we describe a model of product market integration whose predictions can be
mapped to the predictions of the model we use to derive results in the main text.
There are N symmetric economies. In each of these economies, agents are endowed with
a given amount of a non-produced good that can be either consumed or used as an input
into the production of consumption goods. There is a continuum of consumption good types,
i ∈ [0, 1] ≡ I, that can (potentially) be produced in each economy. In each economy, there is a
unit mass of identical consumers with preferences
u
(
y, x
)
= y +
∫ 1
0
min
{
x(i), x(i)
}
di,
where y is consumption of the endowment good and x(i) is consumption of product i. Con-
sumers view products of the same type, i, that are produced in different economies as being
homogeneous in consumption. Without loss of generality, we assume that products are or-
dered so that i′′ > i′ ⇒ x(i′′) > x(i′). We also assume that x(i) is a continuous function of i.
Given these preferences, a consumer is willing to buy up to x(i) units of product i at any price
p(i) ≤ 1.
In each economy, and for each product i, there is a finite number, M ≥ 2, of work-
ers/managers of type i that can be employed to oversee the production of good i. Each worker-
/manager of type i is hired by a single firm—and so, for each good i, there are at most M firms
(potentially) producing product i in each economy. There are otherwise no barriers to entry.
A worker of type i can be either employed to produce good i or, alternatively, employed to
produce one unit of the endowment good. Doing the latter always requires positive effort on
the part of the worker. Each worker/manager is also a consumer. With a unit mass of work-
ers/consumers in the economy, this implies that the mass of product types equals 1/M.
Each of the firms that has hired a worker of type i—i.e. each firm that operates in sec-
tor i—can produce any quantity of product i using the endowment good as an input at a
constant marginal input cost equal to 1/φ, where φ is a firm-specific productivity draw. The
probability of a firm experiencing a certain productivity draw depends on whether or not the
worker/manager the firm has hired chooses to exert positive effort—at a positive cost to the
worker/manager. If the manager exerts positive effort, the draw is φ > 1 with probability γ
and φ ∈ [1, φ) otherwise. If the worker/manager exerts no effort, the draw is φ with certainty.
Once productivity draws are realized, firms compete with each other in prices in all consumer
markets to which they have access.
Consider next an autarkic economy. With M firms in sector i, and assuming that each
worker/manager in each firm has exerted positive effort, with probability
M γ
(
1− γ)M−1 ≡ Mpi,
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a single firm will experience a draw φ and all other firms will experience a productivity draw
φ. In this case, the firm that has experienced the favourable draw will be able, by pricing just
marginally below p = 1/φ, to keep other firms from producing, thus securing profits equal to(
1/φ− 1/φ) x(i) = µ x(i) ≡ R(i).
In all other realizations, there will either be at least two firms experiencing φ, or all firms will
experience φ; in all these cases, price competition will drive prices down to a point where
p(i) = 1/φ. The market will then be shared by more than one firm and all firms, whether they
are active or inactive, will experience zero profits. Thus, under autarky, any given firm in sector
i experiences a profit R(i) with probability pi and a profit equal to zero with probability 1− pi.
Expected interim profits with effort for any firm operating in sector i are therefore piR(i) =
γ(1− γ)Mµ x(i) ≡ α(i).
We assume x(i) > 1/(pi µ), ∀i. This implies α(i) > 1, ∀i; i.e. the expected return of a worker
of type i in the production of good i is greater than the alternative of employing the worker
to produce one unit of the endowment good. Only interim profits, R(i), are verifiable, not the
productivity draw; and so payments to worker/managers can only be conditioned on R(i):
the worker/manager’s pay is wL(i) when the firm experiences a zero interim profit realization
and wH(i) when it experiences a positive interim profit realization. The compensation level
wH(i) is formally structured as follows: wH(i) = wL(i) + σ(i)R(i); i.e. wH(i) equals the base
pay, wL(i), plus a bonus component consisting of a share, σ(i), of the interim profits, R(i).
Structuring pay in this way ensures that the interim incentives of the managers when making
pricing decisions (once the effort choice has been made) are aligned with those of the firm.
The ex-ante expected profits of the firm, under positive effort, will then equal E[Π(i)] =
pi
(
R(i) − wH(i)
) − (1 − pi)wL(i). Absent barriers to entry, these will have to be zero in
equilibrium. The equilibrium contract for each worker type will therefore be a contract(
wL(i), wH(i) = wL(i) + σ(i)R(i)
)
that satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint with
equality (as we detail discuss in the main text) and results in zero ex-ante expected profits for
the firm.
Now suppose that the N economies become integrated. In this case, we have
pi(N) = γ
(
1− γ)NM−1, R(i, N) = N µ x(i),
with dpi(N)/dN < 0 and dR(i, N)/dN > 0. Being the only firm in sector i to experience φ
is now less likely; but if that happens, the firm that experiences φ earns positive profits in
each of the N consumer markets.30 Expected interim profits, gross of the expected payments
to worker/managers, equal
pi(N) R(i, N) = γ
(
1− γ)NM−1N µ x(i).
30This is similar to the mechanism at work in trade models where Ricardian comparative advantage
results from idiosyncratic technology shocks, as in Eaton and Kortum (2002). When trade opens up, the
country with the lowest production cost for any given product variety will secure the demand from all
countries for that variety—a ‘winner-takes-all’ effect.
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These are not invariant to a change in N, i.e. an increase in N combines a mean-preserving
spread with a positive expected productivity shift that affects all productivity types uniformly.
As discussed in Section 4, however, such a uniform productivity shift is of no consequence for
our results.
B Derivations of expressions and proofs of results
B.1 Lemma 1
For all productivity types, α > αˆ, that select into performance-based contracts, the low wage level, wL,
is strictly positive.
PROOF: From (8a), the productivity level below which wL ≤ 0 in a performance-based contract
is given by pi (Γ− 1) g/(1− t) ≡ α0. The expected payoff to an individual in a performance-
based contract must equal EUN in equilibrium; this is the level of expected utility associated
with receiving wH with probability ηpi and wL with probability 1− ηpi, i.e. a lottery with ex-
pected value
ηpi wH + (1− ηpi)wL =
α
(
1+ ηpi(Γ− 1))− pig(Γ− 1)(1− η)/(1− t)
1+ pi(Γ− 1) ≡ EW
N .
The productivity level for which EWN = EWF = ηα is (Γ − 1) g/(1 − t) ≡ α˜ > α0. By
risk aversion, an individual will always prefer a certain prospect to an uncertain one of equal
expected value; and so, for α = α˜, it must be the case that EUF > EUN . By (12), this implies
α˜ < αˆ and α0 < αˆ (since α0 < α˜). Thus, productivity types that select into performance-based
contracts will receive a positive wage even when unsuccessful. Since wF > 0 and wH > wL,
wages will be positive for all productivity types in all realizations, implying that a limited
liability constraint w ≥ 0, if present, can never be binding. 
B.2 Proof of Proposition 1
If η → 1, then there can be no positive solution αˆ < 1: the insurance motive dominates,
and the fixed-wage contract becomes be preferred to the performance-based contract by all
productivity types. For η < 1, the expression K is negative for c approaching c and approaches
infinity for c approaching zero; and so we can always find a threshold, c˜ < c, such that for
c < c˜ the condition K > g/(1− t) is met and therefore αˆ ∈ (0, α).
The rest of the results follow from (12). 
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B.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Differentiating the expression for K in (13) with respect to pi and letting
Ψ ≡ −(1− η) Γ(ηpi−1)/
(
1+ pi(Γ− 1)− Γηpi
)2
< 0, we obtain
dK
dpi
= Ψ
(
Γ
(
1− c
(1− η)pi
)
− 1
)
> 0 , (B.1)
where the sign follows from (6) and from the expression in parentheses being negative.
The expression for αˆ is g/
(
(1− t)K), which is decreasing in K and increasing in g. In turn,
for a given t, g is decreasing in αˆ. Consider then an increase in K accompanied by a reduction in
αˆ. If the increase in g caused by the fall in αˆ were large enough to offset the negative effect on αˆ
of a higher K, then αˆwould rise, and so g would have to fall rather than rise: a contradiction. So,
for a given t, αˆ must be decreasing in K (and thus in pi), as stated in part (i) of the proposition.
For part (ii), wH is unambiguously decreasing in pi from (8b). For given t, and with αˆ rising
from (13) and (B.1), a counteracting effect comes from the simultaneous reduction in the tax
base, and hence in g. This effect, however, can never dominate the direct effect of a change in
pi. If it did, then it would not only lower wH, but also raise wL from (8a). This would align the
pre-tax wage levels for an unchanged expected wage, and would thus make the performance-
based contract unambiguously more attractive, relative to the fixed-wage contract. But then αˆ
would need to fall, a contradiction to part (i) proven above. 
B.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Differentiating (19) with respect to K gives
∂2g
∂t ∂K
=
dQ
dK
+ t
d2Q
dt dK
; (B.2)
where
t
d2Q
dt dK
= −t (1− η)
(
d f (αˆ)
dα
αˆ
dαˆ
dt
dαˆ
dK
+ f (αˆ)
dαˆ
dt
dαˆ
dK
+ f (αˆ) αˆ
d2αˆ
dt dK
)
. (B.3)
From the definitions of αˆ and Q in (13) and (18), we get the following derivatives
dαˆ
dt
=
∂αˆ
∂t
=
g
(1− t)2K =
αˆ
1− t ,
dQ
dK
= −(1− η) f (αˆ) αˆ dαˆ
dK
. (B.4)
From (13) and (B.4), and letting Z ≡ ((1− t)K + t (1− η) f (αˆ) αˆ)K:
dαˆ
dK
= − g
(1− t)K2 +
t
(1− t)K
dQ
dK
= − g
Z
,
d2αˆ
dt dK
=
dαˆ
dK
1
1− t = −
g
(1− t) Z . (B.5)
Substituting (B.4)–(B.5) into (B.3) gives
t
d2Q
dt dK
=
t (1− η) αˆ g
(1− t) Z
(
d f (αˆ)
dα
αˆ+ 2 f (αˆ)
)
. (B.6)
Using the first term in (B.5) to rewrite dQ/dK and substituting this along with (B.6) into (B.2)
yields (21) in the main text. 
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B.5 Derivation of (25)
From the utilitarian welfare function (23), the first-order condition for a welfare-maximizing t
is
dW
dt
=
∫ αˆ
α
dEUF(α)
dt
dα+
∫ α
αˆ
dEUE(α)
dt
dα−
(
EUE(αˆ)− EUF(αˆ)
) dαˆ
dt
= 0 . (B.7)
The last term on the LHS of (B.7) is zero because EUE(αˆ) = EUF(αˆ) by the definition of αˆ.
Expanding the remaining terms dEUZ(α)/dt, Z ∈ {E, F}, we get
dEUZ(α)
dt
=
∂EUZ(α)
∂g
dg
dt
+
∂EUZ(α)
∂t
, Z ∈ {E, F} ; (B.8)
where
∂EUE(α)
∂g
=
1
g + (1− t) α > 0 ;
∂EUF(α)
∂g
=
1
g + (1− t) η α > 0 ; (B.9)
∂EUE(α)
∂t
=
−α
g + (1− t) α < 0 ;
∂EUF(α)
∂t
=
−η α
g + (1− t) η α < 0 . (B.10)
The terms in (B.10) are summarized in (25) in the main text. Since ∂EUZ(α)/∂g is positive and
∂EUZ(α)/∂t is negative, we must have dg/dt > 0 at an optimum. 
B.6 Condition for dt/dpi > 0 —utilitarian objective, general distri-
bution
The FONC for a welfare-maximizing t can be written as
dW
dt
=
∫ 1
0
dEU(α)
dt
dF(α) = 0. (B.11)
Letting z(α) =
(
1− (1− η)1(α<αˆ)
)
α, where 1(·) is an indicator function, and using the ex-
pressions
dEU(α)
dt
=
dg/dt− z(α)
g + (1− t) z(α) , (B.12)
the FONC can be written as
dg
dt
Ξ− Ξ˜ ≡ Ω = 0, (B.13)
where Ξ ≡ ∫ 10 ξ(α)dF(α) > 0, Ξ˜ ≡ ∫ 10 z(α) ξ(α)dF(α) > 0, and ξ(α) ≡ 1/(g + (1− t) z(α)).
Condition (B.13) can also be expressed as dg/dt = Λ ≡ Ξ˜/Ξ. The expression Λ measures
the marginal welfare cost of the tax relative to the marginal welfare brought about by the
associated marginal increase in revenue.31
31In the extreme case of a Rawlsian objective, we have z(0) = 1, z(α) = 0, α > 0; and so Q˜ = 0,
implying that an optimal tax structure simply maximizes tax revenues. In the other extreme case of
linear utility (risk neutrality), we have ξ(α) = 1 (implying Ξ = 1) and Ξ˜ equals the tax base, Q; and
so, since dg/dt = Q+ t dQ/dt, the left-hand side of (B.13) simplifies to t dQ/dt, which is negative and
implies a corner solution at t = 0.
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The sign of dt/dpi coincides with the sign of dΩ/dK ≡ ΩK. Denoting dg/dt as gt, and
using further subscripts to denote total derivatives, the condition ΩK > 0 can be expressed as
ΩK = gtK Ξ+ gt ΞK − Ξ˜K > 0. (B.14)
Substituting Ξ with Ξ˜/gt from B.13, condition (B.14) can be expressed as
Ξ
K
(
K
gtK
gt
+ K
ΞK
Ξ
− K Ξ˜K
Ξ˜
)
=
Ξ
K
(
e
gt
K + e
Ξ
K − eΞ˜K
)
> 0, (B.15)
where the e’s denote elasticities. Since Ξ/K > 0, (B.15) will be satisfied iff
e
gt
K > e
Λ
K , (B.16)
i.e. if the elasticity of marginal revenue with respect to an increase in K exceeds the correspond-
ing elasticity of Λ.
The elasticity condition (B.16) involves a comparison of a change in the marginal revenue
effectiveness of the tax (on the LHS) with a change in the distributional effectiveness of the
tax (on the RHS). While the former only depends on the level and the slope of f (α) at αˆ, the
latter incorporates an integral (Ξ˜K) that depends on the shape of f (α) over its full support
[0, 1]. In Appendix B.8 we show that condition (B.16) is always fulfilled when the distribution
of ability types is uniform. If instead there is a comparatively larger mass of individuals below
αˆ, a rise in αˆ triggered by a fall in pi, and hence K, tends to reduce the efficiency costs of the tax
proportionately more than it reduces the redistributive value of the tax.
B.7 Derivation of (26)
For the uniform ability distribution F(α) = α, expression (18) simplifies to
g = t Q =
t
2
(
1− (1− η) αˆ2) , (B.17)
and the response of the tax base Q with respect to the tax rate t becomes
dQ
dt
= −(1− η) αˆ dαˆ
dt
. (B.18)
Using (B.9)-(B.10) in (B.7) gives
dW
dt
=
Θ
η
(
g
1− t +
dg
dt
)
− 1 = 0 , Θ ≡ η ln g + (1− t)
g + (1− t) αˆ + ln
g + (1− t) η αˆ
g
> 0. (B.19)
The term Θ in (B.19) is positive since, with αˆ ∈ (0, 1) the fractions for which the logarithms are
taken are both greater than unity.
With a uniform ability distribution, it is possible to obtain a closed-form solution for g.
Solving the balanced-budget condition (B.17) and using αˆ in (13) gives
g =
t (1− t)K
(1− t)K + µ , µ ≡
√
(1− t)2K2 + (1− η) t2 > 0 . (B.20)
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Using (B.20) in (B.19) gives the final expression for the first-order condition:
dW
dt
=
Θ
η
(1− t)K2
µ
(
(1− t)K + µ) − 1 = 0. (B.21)
Differentiating the first-order condition (B.21) with respect to K gives, in a first step
d2W
dt dK
=
(1− t)K(
(1− t)K + µ) µ2
(
A
Θ
η
+
B
(K + µ)(K + 1)
)
, (B.22)
where
A ≡ (1− t)K + 2µ
µ
(
µ− (1− t)K) > 0 ,
B ≡ K (K + 1) ((1− t)2K + µ)− µ (K + µ) (K + (K + 1)/(K + η)) .
Using the first-order condition (B.21) to eliminate Θ/η gives, after some manipulations,
d2W
dt dK
=
(1− t)K(
(1− t)K + µ)µ2
((
(1− t)K + 2µ) (µ2 − (1− t)2K2)
(1− t)K2
+
Kµ+ (1− t)2(K + 1)K2 − µ2K
(K + µ)(K + 1)
− µ
K + µ
)
. (B.23)
Using µ2 − (1− t)2K2 = t2(1− η), this can be further simplified to yield (26) in the main text.

B.8 Proof of Proposition 5
We need to show that (26) is positive for all levels of K and t. Ignoring the first positive term
in parentheses, a sufficient condition for this to be true is that
2t2(K + 1)(K + η)− (1− t)K2
(1− t)K2(K + 1)(K + η) > 0 ⇒ (2t
2 + t− 1)K2 + 2t2(K+ η+ η K) ≡ H(K) > 0 , (B.24)
for all levels of K. We first evaluate H(K) in (B.24) for K → 0. This gives H(K)|K→0 → +∞,
since t approaches zero less quickly than K does. This follows from the fact that αˆ in (13) must
approach a maximum when K → 0 and hence effort costs c are at a maximum:
∂K
∂c
= Ψpi
(
(1− η) + (Γ− 1)(1− ηpi)) < 0 , (B.25)
where Ψ has been defined in the Proof of Proposition 3.
Next, we evaluate H(K) for K → ∞. In this case αˆ → 0 from (13) and the tax becomes a
non-distortive instrument. Hence t→ 1, which implies H(K)|K→∞ > 0 from (B.24).
It remains to show that H(K) > 0 holds also for all intermediate values of K. Differentiating
H(K) in (B.24) with respect to K gives
dH
dK
= 2(2t2 + t− 1)K + 2t2(1+ η) + (4t(K + η + η K + K2) + K2) dt
dK
. (B.26)
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Figure A.1: Graph of H(K)
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We first show that dH/dK is positive for both K → 0 and K → ∞. Evaluating (B.26) at K → 0
leaves the second and third terms. These must both be positive, since H(K)|K→0 > 0 is a
sufficient condition for (dt/dK)|K→0 > 0. Evaluating (B.26) at K → ∞, the first term must be
positive, as t→ 1 from the argument above. Moreover, the third term in (B.26) is positive given
that H|K→∞ > 0 is a sufficient condition for (dt/dK)|K→∞ > 0. It follows that H(K) < 0 can
only occur for some intermediate range of K when the graph of H(K) has two local extrema,
as shown in Figure 8.
We proceed by contradiction and assume that this is indeed the case. Then the H(K) curve
must cross the K-axis twice, at levels K1 and K2. We rewrite H(K) in (B.24) as
H(K) = K
(
(2t2 + t− 1)K + 2t2(1+ η) + 2t
2η
K
)
. (B.27)
Assume that (B.27) is zero at K = K1, implying that the sum of terms in the large parentheses
is zero. Moreover, by assumption, H(K) must be negative between K1 and K2. Hence t|K2
must be smaller than t|K1 .32 But then a comparison of the three terms in the large parentheses
of (B.27) shows that these are all smaller at K2 than at K1. The first term must be negative if
H(K1) = 0 is to hold, and it is smaller (i.e., more negative) at K2, since K2 > K1 and t|K2 < t|K1 .
Moreover, under these conditions the positive second and third terms are both unambiguously
smaller at K2 then they are at K1. Hence when H(K1) = 0, there cannot be a value K2 > K1
for which H(K2) = 0 holds. But then the graph of H(K) cannot be as depicted in Figure 8.
By contradiction, this implies that H(K) > 0 must hold for any level of K. Since H(K) > 0 is
sufficient for dt/dK > 0, this proves the result. 
32To be precise, H(K) < 0 is only a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for t to fall between K1
and K2. But if t does not fall between K1 and K2, then it cannot fall for any level of K, because H(K) > 0
holds for K < K1 and for K > K2. The result would then follow immediately.
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